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Abstract 
There is some evidence to support the view that Child Support (CS), despite low 
compliance rates and a strong interaction with the welfare system, has played a 
positive role in reducing child poverty among non-intact families. However, relatively 
little research has addressed the role of CS on outcomes for the children concerned. 
There are good reasons for thinking that CS could leverage better outcomes than other 
forms of income support and, using a sample of dependent children in non-intact 
families from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we find that CS received 
has an effect which is at least 10 times as large as that associated with variations in 
other sources of total household net income for two key educational outcomes: 
namely school leaving at the age of 16, and attaining 5 or more good GCSEs. We 
show that this remarkable and strong result is robust and, in particular, can be given a 
causal interpretation. 
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The impact of parental separation (excluding death) on children has been a 
longstanding concern of social scientists. While there has been a general consensus 
that parental separation is associated with adverse outcomes for children (for surveys, 
see e.g. Amato and Keith (1991), Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Amato (2001)), the 
extent to which this correlation is causal is far from clear. Causality becomes difficult 
to infer if there are important omitted variables that are likely to be correlated with 
separation. Most studies provide only the reduced form effect of separation - they do 
not provide evidence that it is separation per se that matters or the unobservables 
associated with separation. Thus, while such studies identify a problem, they fail to 
tell us what the problem is. For example, many such studies typically omit income 
despite the considerable evidence that income does affect child outcomes (see e.g. 
Dahl and Lochner (2005), Plug and Vijverberg (2003, 2005), Chevalier et al. 
(2005)and Francesconi et al. (2005)). That is, few studies have attempted to separate 
out the effects of one parent (mostly the father) leaving on the outcomes for the 
children, from the effects of that parent's income leaving. 
Child support (CS) is the monetary transfer made by the non-custodial parent 
(usually the father) to the custodial parent (usually the mother), for the care and 
support of children of a relationship that has broken down. In most countries there is a 
system of CS that both reduces the financial effects of separation on children and 
raises the costs of separation to the non-custodial parent.
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 It is widely believed that CS, both the possibility of any CS being paid and the 
amount paid (i.e. the extensive and the intensive margin), has played a positive role in 
reducing child poverty among non-intact families (see e.g. Meyer and Hu (1999)).
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Despite the attention paid to child poverty because of its apparent adverse effects on 
outcomes for children, and to the role that CS plays in reducing child poverty, little 
research has been done on the role of CS on the outcomes for the children concerned. 
This gap in our knowledge is particularly troublesome in the UK because the system 
                                                 
1
 See Cancian et al (2003) for US evidence and González (2005) for evidence from across 16 countries. 
2
 CS not only affects child outcomes through a direct income effect, it may also cause indirect incentive 
effects on maternal quality selection, fertility decisions, prenatal investments, and birth outcomes. 
Walker and Zhu (2006) show that an increase in CS liabilities arising from the introduction of complex 
CS rules in 1993 significantly reduced the risk of partnership dissolution for couples in the UK. Aizer 
and McLanahan (2006) find that stricter state CS enforcement leads to fewer out-of-wedlock births and 
an increase in both the average education of mothers and investment of prenatal care in the US. 
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of CS in the UK is in the process of being reformed: moving from a system where CS 
is determined by a very simple rule, to one that seems likely to entail a great deal 
more idiosyncratic variation in CS. In particular, it seems likely that the reform will 
reduce CS payments, unless compliance can be radically improved.
3
 
 Notable US exceptions are the studies by Knox (1996) and Argys et al. (1998), 
both of which investigate causation of CS on child educational outcomes by 
exploiting cross-state variation in CS enforcement using the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY). The sample in Knox (1996) contains relatively young 
mothers aged between 23 and 31 and is disproportionately from lower socioeconomic 
status and minority families. Knox shows that an increase in CS of $1,000 per year 
increase children’s reading and maths test scores for 5-8 year olds in single-parent 
families by around 7% of a standard deviation, which is one order of magnitude 
higher than that from other income sources. Moreover, the CS coefficient in the 
instrumental variables model using cross-state variation in CS levels, and other 
indicators of local economic environment, remains statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Knox also shows that CS predicted by economic conditions and state average 
CS levels do not help explain variations in achievement test scores for children living 
with both parents. 
 Argys et al. (1998) revisit the NLSY data a few years later, as the sample 
becomes more representative of children who are born to NLSY mothers. While 
showing that the CS coefficient is no longer statistically significant under the Knox 
(1996) specification with the updated sample, Argys et al. estimate a specification 
which controls for race and out-of-wedlock births and distinguishes between 
cooperative and non-cooperative awards. The additional positive effect of CS on 
children’s cognitive outcomes is only found for blacks in the divorced/separated 
sample and for whites in the non-marital birth sample. Instrumenting CS and total 
family income using local economic and demographic indicators as well as policy 
variables relating to divorce, CS and welfare generosity of the state, the authors find 
that the effects of CS persist only for blacks in the divorced sample. 
                                                 
3
 The system of CS in the UK was reviewed by David Henshaw for the Department of Work and 
Pensions in July 2006. His main recommendations include encouraging most parents to make their own 
CS arrangement and significantly increasing the level of CS disregards in benefit calculation. For the 
details see http://www.dwp.gov.uk/childsupport/henshaw_report.asp. 
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 Researchers have hypothesized the following mechanisms through which CS 
may have beneficial effects on children over and above income from other sources 
(Knox (1996), Aizer and McLanahan (2006)): 
1) Kooreman (2000) presents empirical evidence that the marginal propensity to 
consume child clothing out of exogenous child benefits is much larger than 
that out of other income sources for households with one child in the 
Netherlands. He interprets this finding as evidence of the labelling effect of a 
child benefit system. Such a “labelling (hypothecation) effect” might also arise 
in the context of CS, so that CS may improve children’s outcomes more than 
other sources of income, if mothers feel obliged to spend it directly on 
children. Del Boca and Flinn (1994) find that coefficients associated with CS 
and alimony income are significantly higher than those for other types of 
income in estimated Engel curves for expenditures on child-specific goods.  
2) CS may affect relationships between the non-custodial father and the custodial 
mother and between the father and his child differently than income from 
other sources. On form of such improved family dynamics would be increased 
visitation. However, the effect is theoretically ambiguous a priori (e.g. 
Ermisch (2005), Del Boca and Ribero (2001)), and both Knox (1996) and 
Argys et al. (1998) found little evidence that contact between the child with 
the absent father matters.  
3) It is possible that the adverse effects that may be associated with other forms 
of income are absent from CS. For example, welfare income may be 
stigmatised, and income from maternal employment may carry imply poorer 
childcare (see Gregg et al. (2005) and Rhum (2004)); and while step-parents 
might be associated with higher levels of household income step-parents may 
feel less altruistic towards a step-child (see, for example, Case et al. 1999). 
4) Finally, there may be a degree of reverse causality. Aughinbaugh (2001) 
suggests that custodial mothers might invest more in the child as a signal to 
the absent father in order to secure future CS payments. Indeed, she does find 
that measures of child achievement have a significant positive effect on both 




However, a plausible alternative to the above explanations is that the 
relationship between CS receipts and child’s educational outcomes might reflect a 
selection effect (unmeasured heterogeneity among families) rather than a causal 
effect. For instance, payment of CS by an absent father might be correlated with his 
commitment, and perhaps that of the mother, to the well-being of the child. From a 
policy point of view, it is extremely important to be able to discriminate between 
these two explanations. 
 Our own empirical work is based on the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). Unlike the NLSY which overrepresents younger mothers, our sample is 
representative of all non-intact families. Using a sample of dependent children under 
16 in non-intact families whose real educational outcomes are observable, we find 
that CS received has an effect which is at least 10 times as large as that of other 
household net income for two key educational outcomes: namely school leaving at the 
age of 16, and attaining 5 or more GCSEs.
4
 This result is remarkably robust with 
respect to adding controls for characteristics of the child and the custodial mother, 
which can be interpreted as evidence against a pure selection story. To investigate the 
extent to which the relationship is a causal one, we then instrument current CS 
receipts using retrospective information on mother’s fertility, relationship and 
employment before the birth of the child. We find that the strong CS effect found in 
our simple probit models holds up in the IV specification.  
II. Data 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is an ongoing nationally 
representative sample of some 10,000 original sample members (OSMs) recruited in 
1991. These OSMs, and all adult members of their families, are re-interviewed 
annually in subsequent years. The BHPS collects information on household 
composition, housing, employment, education, health and incomes in all waves. It is a 
particularly rich dataset with lifetime histories of marriage, cohabitation, fertility and 
employment transitions, allowing us to match all children to their natural parents and 
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 These are arguably the two most important measures of educational attainment in the UK: the former 
captures the dropout rate at the minimum school leaving age while the latter is a key quality indicator 
of the standard the pupil has achieved. The General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) has 
been the principal means of assessing pupil attainment at the end of compulsory secondary education 
since 1988.  
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establish the timing of departure of any absent parents, even for partnerships 
dissolved before the sample began.   
< Figure 1 here > 
We focus on school leaving and the attainment of 5 or more GCSEs by the age 
of 16 for all children in non-intact families in this paper. Figure 1 reports the two 
outcomes and CS receipts by family types, where non-intact families are further 
divided into two groups depending on whether or not the parents were living together 
when the child was born (denoted as separated and single mothers in Table 1). A child 
is defined as living in a non-intact family, if he or she does not live with both natural 
parents at any point in time until he/she reaches the age of sixteen. Note that the way 
the family type is defined means that children living in the same family can be 
classified into different categories.
5
 It is apparent that the outcomes and CS receipts 
differ substantially across intact and non-intact families, and among the latter category 
they also differ between children whose parents separated and children born out-of-
wedlock. For instance, the dropout rates at 16 is 17% for children living with both 
natural parents, as opposed to 27% for children whose parents have separated during 
their childhood and 35% for children living in non-intact families since birth. On the 
other hand, the probability of attaining 5 or more good GCSEs for children born-out-
wedlock is only slightly over half of that for children living in intact families, with 
children in separated families in between.  
< Table 1 here > 
Table 1 reports summary statistics by family types and highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between in-wedlock and out-of-wedlock births. There 
are 1791 distinct youths whose age 16 educational outcomes are observable in the 
first sixteen waves of the BHPS, of which 501 (or 28.0%) live in non-intact families. 
While over half of all separated mothers have received any CS, only three in ten 
single mothers do so. Conditional on receiving any CS, separated mothers received, 
on average, £51.30/week, twice as much as the £25.40/week received by single 
mothers. 
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 Although children of the same natural mother can be classified into different categories due to 
remarriages, our modest sample size precludes a full exploitation of the differences between siblings 
(see e.g. Bjorklund and Sundstrom (2006)). The sample size also does not allow us to further 
distinguish between (previously) married and cohabiting couples, who are treated symmetrically for 





 total household net income for separated and single 
mothers is only 71% and 59% respectively of that for their intact counterparts, at £230 
per week. CS only accounts for less than 9% of total household income for separated 
mothers, and less than 4% for single mothers. 
Table 1 also reports child and mother characteristics which will be controlled 
for in the regression analysis later. The proportion of boys and twins is similar across 
family types. On the other hand, the differences in the average number of dependent 
children in the sample period and birth order might reflect complex interactions of 
fertility and repartnership. Recent studies suggest that family size and birth order are 
potentially important for children’s educational attainment (see e.g. Booth and Kee 
(2005) and Lundberg (2005)). Single mothers have significantly lower education than 
either separated or intact mothers, while there is nothing to distinguish between the 
latter two groups. Table 1 also summarizes the potential instruments based on 
retrospective information on the mother’s fertility, relationship and employment 
history up to the point the child concerned was born. It turns out that mothers in non-
intact families, and single mothers in particular, are younger at their first birth and 
have shorter full-time employment experience. Perhaps more surprisingly, the 
dissolved partnership for separated mothers is almost as likely to have been a first 
marriage or cohabitation spell (lasting 3 months or more) as is the case for intact 
mothers. Our identification strategy relies on these lifetime events which predate the 
birth of the child.  
III. Analysis and Results 
1) Probit Models 
 We focus on the impact of CS on child educational outcomes in this paper. In 
the spirit of Knox (1996) and Argys et al. (1998), we decompose mean equivalised 
total household net incomes into three components according to sources: CS receipts, 
step-fathers’ incomes and other total net incomes which are assumed to be attributable 
                                                 
6
 In our econometric analysis below, we allow for economies of scale in consumption using the popular 
“square root scale” which is commonly used in international comparisons (e.g. by the OECD). Note 
that this scale can be regarded as a special case of the Buhmann et al. (1988) class equivalence scale 
M=h
θ
 where h is the household size and θ=0.5. However, our empirical results are remarkably robust 
with respect to the range of the value of the parameter θ commonly used in the literature, such as a 
value of 0.67, as in Jenkins and Cowell (1994); or indeed other popular equivalence scales, such as the 
“OECD-modified scale” which assigns a value of 1 to the household head, of 0.5 to each additional 
adult and of 0.3 to each child. 
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to the mother. Hence the differences in coefficients across the different income 
sources measure the differential impact of CS and step-fathers’ incomes than those 
from other income sources. However, unlike Argys et al. (1998), we do not control for 
pre-separation family income, as we only observe separations taking place in the 
sample period for one third of the non-intact families.
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< Table 2 here > 
Table 2 presents the marginal effects for the probit models of both outcomes 
for the sample of non-intact families. Model 1 is the simplest model specification 
which only controls for CS, step-fathers’ incomes and other net incomes, all 
equivalised and averaged over non-intact years in the sample period. Model 2 adds 
such child characteristics as gender, number of dependent children in the family, an 
indicator for being twins and dummies for birth order of the child. Finally, Model 3 
adds two important characteristics of the mother: the age she left full-time education 
and an indicator for being non-white.  
It is clear that of the three key variables of interest; only CS is statistically 
significant in explaining the differences in child educational outcomes. A £10 per 
week increase in equivalised CS receipt (the sample mean is £12.3 per week) will 
decrease dropout rates by about 3 percentage points and increase GCSE pass rates by 
just over 4 percentage points respectively. Comparing to the other two income 
sources, this effect is an order of magnitude higher. On the other hand, step-father’s 
income has no significant effect on either school dropouts or attaining GCSEs once 
we control for child characteristics. The residual category of other family net incomes 
turns out to have no statistically significant effect whatsoever on either outcome. 
Moreover, the size of the CS effects is remarkably robust with respect to the 
successive inclusion of child and mother characteristics. If the observed correlation 
between CS and educational outcomes are driven by a selection election, we would 
expect the size of the CS coefficients to decrease in absolute value as we add more 
controls. Hence we interpret the robustness of the CS effect in the simple probit 
models as evidence against a pure selection story. 
2) Instrumental Variable Estimation  
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 Table 1 shows that this window of observation is 6.0 years for separated mothers and 7.4 years for 
single mothers on average. 
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 CS estimates presented in Table 2 will suffer from endogeneity bias if the 
unobserved heterogeneity across households affect both CS receipts (and payments) 
and children’s outcomes. Besides, measurement errors in CS arising from 
misreporting will also lead to biased results in probit models. The standard approach 
to deal with endogeneity and errors-in-variables is two-stage least squares
8
. 
 The set of instruments we use is based on events that took place before the 
birth of the child, i.e. retrospective information on mother’s fertility, relationship and 
employment. To maximize efficiency, we also carry out statistical tests which check 
for redundancy of (combinations of) instruments. The resulting preferred 
parsimonious specification is based on the following three excluded variables: the log 
of mother’s age at first birth; an indicator for whether the dissolved partnership is the 
first marriage or cohabitation (lasting 3 months or more); and the number of years the 
mother has worked as a full-time employee before the birth of the child concerned. 
   < Table 3A+3B here > 
Table 3A presents the first stage estimates for the CS equation. Neither step-
fathers’ incomes nor other net family incomes have any effect on CS receipts. As 
might be expected, both a later age at first birth and being a first marriage increase CS 
receipts, while more years of full-time employment by the mother before birth has the 
opposite effect. Note that the log of mother’s age at first birth and years of full-time 
employment are all individually significant at the 5% level while first marriage is 
marginally significant at the 11% level
9
. The F-statistic for the joint significance of 
the excluded variables is well above 10 in this single endogenous regressor 
specification, thus readily satisfying the “rule of thumb” for weak identification not to 
be considered a problem (see Stock and Watson (2003)).  
 Table 3B presents the second stage 2SLS estimates for the main model 
specification which controls for child and mother characteristics as outlined in Model 
3 in Table 2. In line with the probit estimates, neither step-fathers’ incomes nor other 
total net income has a significant effect on the two educational outcomes. On the 
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 We fail to reject the exogeneity of step-fathers’ incomes and other net family incomes at even the 
30% level of significance for both the school leaving and the GCSE equations in the preferred 
specification in Table 3. 
9
 We include first marriage in our preferred baseline 2SLS specification despite its marginal statistical 
significance because this instrument variable is key to the separate identification of the effect of the 
possibility of any CS being paid and the effect of the amount paid in the next subsection. 
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other hand, the CS effect found in the probit models remains statistically significant 
for both outcomes under this linear probability specification. While the CS effect has 
increased substantially in size, in comparison to the probit specification, so has the 
standard error.
10
 Indeed, given the large standard errors, one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same across the two different specifications, at 
least for the school leaving equation. In interpreting these findings, more emphasis 
should be placed on the direction and statistical significance rather than the exact size 
of the coefficients for CS. It is also worth noting that the IV models pass both the 
Anderson IV relevance test and the Sargan over-identification test of all instruments 
at conventional level of significance. Moreover, the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic is 
greater than the critical value for 5% maximal IV relative size for the Stock-Yogo 
weak instruments test, thus lending strong support to the validity of our instruments.   
3) Two-stage Estimation with CS Predicted by a Selection Model 
 It is apparent from Table 1 that only half of separated mothers and one third of 
single mothers ever receive CS. From an econometric point of view, this implies that 
it is important to allow for left-censoring of CS (i.e. we don’t observe negative CS in 
our data). From a policy perspective, it is also of interest to separate out the effect of 
receiving any CS from that induced by the variation in the amount of CS received.  
 In the following, we will estimate a two-stage model where CS is predicted by 
the Heckman Full Maximum Likelihood model in the first step (see Maddala (1983) 
and Heckman (1979)). This approach provides for consistent estimates in the presence 
of a censored endogenous variable and has been widely used in labour economics (see 
e.g. Jacobsen and Rayack (1996)).  
< Table 4 here > 
Table 4 shows the Heckman selection model estimates which are used to 
predict CS for the second stage. The separate identification of the possibility that the 
mother receives any CS over the sample period from that the amount received 
conditional on receiving is achieved using the same 3 instruments as in our 2SLS 
estimation in Tables 3A and 3B. In particular, first marriage is shown to have a large 
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 This is a common feature of the IV approach in general, given the trade-off between consistency and 
efficiency. Moreover, least square estimate has a persistent bias towards zero when the regressor 
concerned is measured with error. This is known as the attenuation effect (see e.g. Greene (2000)). 




positive impact on receiving any CS. On the other hand, mother's age at first birth 
appear to have a positive effect on CS amount while mother’s number of years as full-
time employee before birth of the child has a negative effect. The signs of all 3 
variables seem to make sense and are statistically significant. However neither the 
estimate of the cross-equation correlation, ρ, nor the inverse Mills ratio term, λ, is 
significantly different from zero.  
< Table 5 here > 
Using predicted CS from the MLE selection models and bootstrapping 
standard errors, we find the effects of CS in Table 5 are remarkably similar to our 
baseline 2SLS results. A £10 per week increase in equivalised CS received will 
reduce dropout rates by 5.6 percentage points while increase GCSE pass rates by 11.0 
percentage points respectively. Although stepfather’s income now appears to be 
statistically significant for attaining 5 or more good GCSEs, the size of the effect is 
still an order of magnitude smaller than that of the CS.  
4) Sensitivity Analysis 
 One might be concerned with the use of a measure of CS, which is averaged 
over the non-intact years in the sample period. Table 6 presents the second-stage IV 
estimates
11
 with binary measures for whether the mother has ever received CS during 
the sample period.  
< Table 6 here > 
 It is striking that the CS effect remains significant for both outcomes, despite 
the loss of efficiency through using dichotomous measures of CS receipt as indicated 
by the drop in the Anderson IV relevance test statistic and the Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic.
12
 These results support the hypothesis that improved family dynamics 
associated with the receipts of any CS (i.e. change at the extensive margin) are just as 
important as that induced by changes in the amount of CS received (i.e. change at the 
intensive margin) as far as children’s educational outcomes are concerned. 
< Table 7A+7B here > 
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 To save space, first stage IV estimates for the sensitivity analyses are not shown but will be available 
from the authors upon request. 
12
 However, the test of joint significance of the excluded instruments still satisfied the “rule of thumb”.  
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Table 7A and 7B present the second-stage IV estimates separately for non-
intact families with below median family net incomes and above. For the poorest half 
of non-intact families which is overrepresented by single parents and benefit 
recipients, the CS effect is only statistically significant for attaining 5 or more GCSEs, 
although it still has the right sign for the school leaving equation. One possible 
explanation for this finding is that income has to be above a critical threshold for CS 
to have a significant effect. The complex interaction between CS and social security 
benefits that withdraw out-of-work benefits pound for pound might also be 
responsible. Besides, the measurement error problem is also likely to be more acute 
for benefit recipients. 
In contrast, Table 7B clearly shows that the CS effects remain statistically 
significant for non-intact families with above median incomes, although only at 10% 
for school leaving decisions. The fact that the size of the CS effect on attaining 5 or 
more GCSEs are quite similar across the two subsamples while that on school leaving 
is almost twice as big for the poor half of the sample - implying that CS matters even 
more for the school leaving of children who are poor.  
< Table 8 here > 
 Finally, Table 8 presents evidence for separated couples only, which accounts 
for around 80% of all non-intact families. Although the sizes of the CS effects are 
somewhat reduced, especially for the school leaving equation, they remain significant 
at the 5% significance level for both equations. This suggests that the causal effect we 
find earlier is not driven by the inclusion of children born out-of-wedlock.  
 Taken together, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the effect of CS on 
attaining 5 or more good GCSEs is remarkably robust across various types of non-
intact families or the income distribution. However, the effect of CS on school leaving 
decisions appears to be more heterogeneous, with a stronger response for children 
born out of wedlock or living in poorer families. 
IV. Conclusion 
 Our findings indicate that CS payments have a beneficial effect on educational 
outcomes for children living in non-intact families in the UK that is well in excess of 
the effect of income from other sources. This result is very robust with respect to the 
12 
 
successive addition of controls for child and mother characteristics, and hence offers 
little support to the selection explanation of the CS effect.   
Moreover, our instrumental variable estimated coefficients of the CS effect, 
based on retrospective information on fertility, relationship and employment of the 
mother, remain highly significant. We carry out sensitivity analyses to ensure that our 
results are not caused by weak instruments or the inclusion of children born out-of-
wedlock. Our robustness checks also suggest that the CS change at the extensive 
margin is at least as important as the change at the intensive margin and the CS effects 
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Intact Father at birth No Father at birth













School leaving at 16 (%) 17.4 26.6 34.9 
5 or more Good GCSEs (%) 57.2 44.8 35.8 
Proportion of time mother repartnered (%) - 37.3 33.9 
Ever Repartnered (%) - 53.9 50.9 
Ever received CS - 52.4 32.1 
CS Received conditional on receiving (£/week) - 51.3 25.4 





2.10 1.93 1.94 
Equivalised CS receipt (£/week) - 14.2 5.0 
Equivalised Step-father’s income (£/week) - 42.0 33.6 
Equivalised other income (£/week) 229.7 107.3 97.7 
Equivalised total income (£/week) 229.7 163.6 136.3 
    
Child’s characteristics    
  Child being boy (%) 50.1 51.1 55.7 
  Number of kids in the family 1.9 2.0 2.3 
  Child being twin (%) 2.3 1.5 2.8 
  1
st
 natural child of mother 43.5 44.3 78.3 
  2
nd
 natural child of mother 37.5 37.2 11.3 
  3
rd
 natural child of mother 14.2 13.9 5.7 
  4
th
 or higher order natural child of mother 4.8 4.6 4.7 
    
Mother’s characteristics    
  Mother’s age left full-time education 17.5 17.6 16.6 
  Mother non-white (%) 4.4 4.1 4.7 
    
Retrospective information of the mother (IVs):      
  Mother’s age at 1st birth 24.9 23.3 20.6 
  (Dissolved) relationship first marriage (%) 86.0 84.6 - 
  Years as f/t employee before birth of the child 6.02 4.79 2.47 
    
Proportion of time child not living with dad (%) - 42.9 100.0 
Number of waves observed in sample 7.1 6.0 7.4 
Obs 1290 395 106 
Note: CS and income are in Jan 2006 prices. 
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Table 2:  Probit Estimates, Marginal Effects 
 Left school at 16 = 1 Attained 5+ GCSEs = 1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




























Equiv. other (mother’s)  













Child Characteristics No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Mother characteristics No No Yes No No Yes 














Log likelihood -290.58 -272.99 -263.98 -323.92 -309.27 -306.66 
Notes: Child characteristics include gender, number of dependent children, dummy for twins, dummies for order 
of births. Mother characteristics include age left full-time education and dummy for being non-white. Standard 
errors in parentheses. Bold and italic figures indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 3A First Stage IV Results, N=501 
Endogenous variable CS Receipts 
Equiv. stepfather’s income (£100/week) 
-0.0038 
(0.0154) 
Equiv. other (mother’s) income (£100/week)  
-0.0027 
(0.0171) 
Log mother’s age at 1st birth 
0.5862 
(0.0866) 
First marriage 0.0374 
(0.0232) 
Number of years mother in full-time 
employment before birth of child 
-0.0077 
(0.0034) 
Shea’s Partial R2 0.1052 
F-statistic of joint significance of instruments 19.09 
P-value (joint significance of IVs) 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold and italic figures indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
level respectively. All reported variables are excluded instruments except for the two income measures which are 
treated as exogenous. 
 
Table 3B IV Estimates Second Stages, N=501 
Outcomes Leaving School at 16 5+ GCSEs 















Anderson canon corr LR statistic Chi-sq (df) 52.726 (3) 
P-value 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat 










P-value 0.493 0.380 
Note: Other regressors include child and mother characteristics as outlined in Table 2. Standard errors in 




Table 4: CS Payments: Estimates from Selection Model with Full Maximum 
Likelihood, N=501 
 
Outcomes Paying any CS Amount CS Paid 
(£100/week) 








Log mother’s age at 1st birth - 0.734 
(0.147) 
First marriage 0.472 
(0.128) 
- 
Number of years mother in full-time 








Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Bold and italic figures indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% 
level respectively. All reported variables are excluded instruments except for the two income measures which are 
treated as exogenous. 
 
 
Table 5: Two-stage Estimation, Second Stage, Standard Errors Bootstapped with 
1000 repetitions, N=501 
Outcomes Leaving School at 16 5+ GCSEs 















Note: Other regressors include child and mother characteristics as outlined in Table 2. Standard errors in 




Table 6 IV Estimates Second Stages, Binary measure of CS receipt, N=501 
Outcomes Leaving School at 16 5+ GCSEs 















Anderson canon corr LR statistic Chi-sq (df) 39.681 (3) 
P-value 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat 
(Stock-Yogo 5% maximal IV relative bias) 
13.96  
(13.91) 
Sargan stat Chi-sq (df) 1.981 (2) 1.092 (2) 
P-value 0.371 0.579 
Note: Other regressors include child and mother characteristics as outlined in Table 2. Standard errors in 




Table 7A IV Estimates Second Stages, Below Median Income, N=251 
Outcomes Leaving School at 16 5+ GCSEs 















Anderson canon corr LR statistic Chi-sq (df) 46.493 (3) 
P-value 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat 
(Stock-Yogo 5% maximal IV relative bias) 
17.96  
(13.91) 
Sargan stat Chi-sq (df) 5.032 (2) 4.289 (2) 
P-value 0.081 0.117 
Note: Other regressors include child and mother characteristics as outlined in Table 2. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Bold and italic figures indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 7B IV Estimates Second Stages), Above Median Income, N=250  
Outcomes Leaving School at 16 5+ GCSEs 















Anderson canon corr LR statistic Chi-sq (df) 22.109 (3) 
P-value 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat 
(Stock-Yogo 20% maximal IV relative bias) 
7.632  
(6.46) 
Sargan stat Chi-sq (df) 0.431 (2) 1.424 (2) 
P-value 0.806 0.491 
Note: Other regressors include child and mother characteristics as outlined in Table 2. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Bold and italic figures indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Table 8 IV Estimates Second Stages, Separated Mothers Only, N=395 
Outcomes Leaving School at 16 5+ GCSEs 















Anderson canon corr LR statistic Chi-sq (df) 55.712 (3) 
P-value 0.000 
Cragg-Donald Wald F Stat 
(Stock-Yogo 5% maximal IV relative size) 
20.85  
(13.91) 
Sargan stat Chi-sq (df) 2.128 (2) 0.543 (2) 
P-value 0.345 0.762 
Note: Other regressors include child and mother characteristics as outlined in Table 2. Bold and italic figures 
indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
  
 
